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Engaged Disengagement: Reframing as Feminist Critique in Vanessa Place’s Tragodía 
 
 
Vanessa Place’s three-volume series of conceptual writing, Tragodía (2011) is part of the 
body of conceptual poetry that has emerged in the U.S in the twenty-first century. In the 
preface to her recent study unoriginal genius: poetry by other means in the new century 
(2010), Marjorie Perloff examines the innovation in contemporary poetry precipitated by the 
unconstrained conditions engendered by the Internet. Perloff observes that during this phase 
of experimentation at the turn of the century, poets became interested not in their own 
linguistic creations but ‘how already existing words and sentences are framed, recycled, 
appropriated, cited, submitted to rules, visualized or sounded.’
1
  Alongside the works of 
Kenneth Goldsmith, Craig Dworkin, and Rob Fitterman, Place’s Tragodía is paradigmatic of 
that which Perloff articulates as the ‘new citational and often constraint bound poetry’
2
, and 
the body of work Goldsmith, following Perloff, terms ‘uncreative writing.’3 A considered 
enquiry into certain concepts and conceptual apparatuses such as allegory, hermeneutics, and 
the performative use of indifference in conceptual writing generates productive insights into 
new narrative conditions produced by Place’s conceptual writing. This essay positions Place’s 
Tragodía as an instance of reframing as contemporary feminist cultural critique. Through 
appropriation, Tragodía creates a field of contextual resistance to the oppression of the 
personhood of the victims of sexual crimes nacted in legal discourse. 
 Place’s Tragodía is a contemporary work of détournement. In an attempt to define a 
contemporary form of détournement, Place makes reference to Patrick Geaney’s quoting of 
Debord in his essay ‘Insinuation: Détournement as Gendered Repetition.’ Place remarks that 
Debord is misquoting Baudelaire in his articulation of détournement, as that which occurs 
when poets ‘enter into enemy territory and repeat the locutions that they undermine. In this 
repetition, poets burrow into language, but they, too, are dug into, penetrated by the very 
language that they want to overcome and keep at a distance.’
4
 The conceptual poet, scholar 
and performance artist, Caroline Bergvall, understands this penetration of the conceptual 
writer by the language the writer’s work seeks to critique to be one of the overarching 
challenges that contemporary women writers meet in their conceptual practices. For Bergvall, 
the difficulty resides in the poet’s struggle to refrain from producing a mode of poetics that is 
a mode of production fetishism. Put simply, Bergvall asks ‘How does one put a text together 
that depersonalizes, that disengages from personalized modes, yet manages to engage with 
                                                        
1
 Marjorie Perloff, unoriginal genius: poetry by other means in a new age, xi. 
2
 Perloff, unoriginal genius, xi. 
3 Kenneth Goldsmith, Uncreative Writing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
4
 Vanessa Place, ‘Afterword’ to I’ll Drown My Book: Conceptual Writing by Women, 446. 
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 2
processes of personification and identification?’5 In Bergvall’s view it is a question of the 
conceptual text’s ability to simultaneously accommodate distance and intimacy: 
 
If literature is perceived as a mediating apparatus, a symbolic representation that 
highlights features of social engineering as much as of individual motivation, how 
does one create textual works where the authorial hold over the text is somehow 
distanced, perhaps neutralized, yet where the structural impact of experience, of 





Responding to the work of 62 women writers in the anthology I’ll Drown My Book: 
Conceptual Writing By Women (2012), Bergvall delineates two pathways that the writers take 
as means to circumvent production fetishism: the ‘road’ and the ‘route’ of ‘engaged 
disengagement.’ The ‘road’ of engaged disengagement involves ‘A willingness to constantly, 
relentlessly examine the means of one’s own intentionality, positioning, assumptions, 
expectations.’  The ‘route’ of engaged disengagement entails ‘A willingness to accept the 
laughable obsessiveness of one’s intent in the face of the all-corrupting consumption machine 
[…] It is dead serious playfulness, interdependence, networked provocation, and conscious 
games.’7 Place’s Tragodía harbours both th  road and the route of engaged disengagement. In 
the following analysis Place’s conceptual practice will be shown to expose and interrogate the 
questions of ‘intentionality, positioning, assumptions, expectations’ that her texts raise. 
Place’s work also generates debates over the work’s complicity with the institutional 
structures of the Law that it seeks to critique, and it is precisely the ‘networked provocation’ 
for which the work is a catalyst, that is a site of resistance in the text.  
By day, Place is an appellate criminal defense attorney in the State of California. Her 
poetic practice involves acts of pure appropriation.
8
 The first volume of Tragodía, entitled 
Statement of Facts, takes the transcriptions of appellate briefs and the legal documents of 
violent sexual criminal acts and resituates them onto the literary page through an act of 
reframing. As Goldsmith has observed, Place’s only alteration of the documents is her 
                                                        
5 Caroline Bergvall, ‘The Conceptual Twist’, Foreword to I’ll Drown My Book: Conceptual 
Writing By Women, edited by Caroline Bergvall, Laynie Browne, Teresa Carmody, and 
Vanessa Place (Los Angeles: Les Figues Press, 2012), p. 21. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Place has carried out other acts of pure appropriation. Her recent work Radio Breaks, Full 
Audio Transcripts is comprised of the communications between the Federal Aviation 
Administration, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and American Airlines that 
took place on September 11, 2001. 
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 3
removal of the serif font demanded by the legal profession. 9  Tragodía is a discursive 
construction, a collage of victims’ and rapists’ depositions, testimonies, and police reports. 
Goldsmith also points to the fact that all of the legal documents that Place appropriates are 
freely available from public records archives.
10
 Yet as both Goldsmith and Moschovakis have 
noted, Place, as attorney, has also written the original documents.11 Place’s key concern in 
this work is the status of personhood as it is intimated or enacted by legal discourse. 
Crucially, the rape victims’ testimonies are narrated to representatives of the law, and as a 
consequence, their discourse is perpetually overlaid in the ideological interpretation of the 
legal narratives. This essay pays close attention to the theatrical dimension of Place’s 
conceptual writing, as a means to explore the condition of personhood in the narratives but 
also to interrogate the way in which a tension between framing and telling in legal discourse 
is registered in Place’s work. Building on Goldsmith’s desire to ‘map […] territories, define 
terminologies, and create contexts’12  in which conceptual writing can be positioned and 
discussed, this essay explores both the potential of conceptual writing to embody a mode of 
resistance to trauma, and to offer a particular contextual encounter between contemporary 
feminist poetics and the law.  
 It is my contention that Tragodía does not represent trauma but rather generates 
trauma through a poetic practice that has a bipartite structure: conceptual writing (allegory) 
and Place’s performance of the narratives.  Place’s performance is an ancillary act of 
reframing that raises the question of what might be at stake in the performative use of 
indifference. The linguistic apparatus of the legal case studies echoes the psychoanalytic case 
studies of Freud and Breuer at the turn of the twentieth century, in which the patient’s 
discourse is narrated, written, and thereby overlaid by the discourse of the psychoanalyst.  
This enquiry seeks to ascertain if traces of subjectivity can be found in the legal narratives, or, 
if the deformation of the speech acts of the subjects in legal discourse has erased all 
subjectivity. In such an analysis both the question of the extent of the depersonalization of the 
victims of rape in legal discourse through the deformation of the their language and speech 
acts arises, as well as the issue of whether Place’s conceptual writing, through the act of 
reframing, is able to create new narrative conditions in which the resistance and constitution 
of the subject is manifested in the text.  
 
 
                                                        
9
 Goldsmith, Uncreative Writing, 104. In his analysis, Goldsmith cites Place’s terms for such 
textual requirements: “those little epaulets of authority.” 
10
 Ibid, 102. 
11 Ibid. Goldsmith is citing Anna Moschovakis, ‘Poetics of Guilt’, American Book Review, 
Vol. 32. Number 4, May/June 2011, 9. 
12 Goldsmith, Uncreative Writing, 11. 
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Place makes a number of theoretical interventions on conceptual writing practices in her 
libretto-manifesto Notes on Conceptualisms (2010), co-authored with Robert Fitterman. In the 
Foreword to this short work, Fitterman gestures towards an understanding of conceptual 
writing in the contemporary period. He states that he, Place, and Anna Moschovakis, use the 
term conceptual writing in the broadest sense ‘so that it intersects with other terms such as: 
allegory, appropriation, piracy, flarf, identity, theft, sampling, constraint and others.’
13
 The 
opening of the manifesto reinforces the homologous relationship between the authors’ works 
and the first of these terms: ‘Conceptual writing is allegorical writing.’
14
 This analogy is 
continually reiterated and explored throughout the manifesto. For Goldsmith, Fitterman, and 
Place, Walter Benjamin is the notable precursor of conceptual writing in terms of both 
practice and theory. Goldsmith considers The Arcades Project (1927-1940) to be ‘the greatest 
book of uncreative writing’
15
 and a clear antecedent to works of pure appropriation in the 
twenty-first century. For Place and Fitterman, it is Benjamin’s chapter on allegory and 
trauerspiel in The Origins of Ge man Tragic Drama (1928) that provides a foundation for 
theorizing allegory today. 
 According to Fitterman and Place, contemporary allegorical writing is comprised of a 
pre-text and a post-text. The first of these components is explained in an early definition: 
 
 The standard features of allegory include extended metaphor, personification, parallel 
 meanings, and narrative. Simple allegories use simple parallelisms, complex ones 
 more profound. Other meanings exist in the allegorical “pre-text,” the cultural 
 conditions within which allegory is created. Allegorical writing is a writing of its 
 time, saying slant what cannot be said directly, usually because of overtly repressive 
 political regimes or the sacred nature of the message.  In this sense the allegory is 






This explanation asserts the reader’s role in the construction of allegory, a key aspect of 
Place’s work when considering her performance. The structure of allegory referenced here 
has a concrete example in Tragodía 1: Statement of Facts, which is comprised of pre-textual 
                                                        
13
 Rob Fitterman and Vanessa Place, Notes on Conceptualisms (Brooklyn: Ugly Duckling 
Press, 2010), 10. 
14 Ibid, 13. 
15 Goldsmith, Uncreative Writing, 109. 
16 Fitterman and Place, Notes on Conceptualisms, 13. 
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materials, being a collage of transcripts of prosecution cases, transcripts of defense cases, 
details of medical examinations/sexual assault examinations, expert testimonies, rebuttals and 
police reports. Read in terms of the features of allegory set out in Note on Conceptualisms, 
the law exists in the allegorical pre-textual construct of Place’s work as manifesting certain 
‘cultural conditions.’ Statement of Facts is the “post-text”, ‘the document necessarily created 
by the pre-text, though post-text may refer to a primary text used in hybrid as a secondary 
text.’17 It is the conceptual procedure of appropriation that enacts the transformation from pre-
text to post-text. Place and Fitterman state: ‘To the degree conceptual writing depends upon 




 The legal documents that form Statement of Facts have been detached from their 
bureaucratic habitation and resituated onto the literary page. Context is a primary form of 
signification in the conceptual work. In her Afterword to the anthology, I’ll Drown My Book, 
Place remarks: ‘in the way of positive or negative space, conceptualism is […] writing in 
which the context is the primary locus of meaning-making.’19 In content, the materials of 
Tragodía remain identical to their original state, when they were housed within the 
parameters of the legal institution. As literary texts however, the documents no longer 
perform the functions for which they were written. For instance, the depositions, formal 
statements used as evidence outside court, do not operate as evidence in a trial when situated 
in a literary context. Rebuttals, often placed after the prosecution and defense cases function 
in the literary text as an addendum, or an Afterword that serves to keep the narrative open and 
in question, rather than fulfilling the legal purpose of refutation and contradiction. Conceptual 
writing mediates, Fitterman and Place observe, ‘between the written object […] and the 
meaning of the object by framing the writing as a figural object to be narrated.’
20
 Read as 
literary texts, the legal statements become narratives. Place’s act of reframing foregrounds 
language and brings to light the theatricality of the discursive constructions and the 
oppressive nature of the ideological discourse within which the victims’ voices are subsumed. 
Victims narrate their traumas to figures of the law and these figures then relate the 
testimonies and frame these organic narratives in the institutional language of the law.  
Within the new literary framework of Statement of Facts the tension between framing and 
telling becomes apparent. It is this cohabitation of framing and telling that is the site of 
Place’s institutional critique.  
                                                        
17 Ibid., 21. 
18 Ibid., 39. 
19
 Place, ‘Afterword’ to I’ll Drown My Book: Conceptual Writing by Women, 446. 
20 Fitterman and Place, Notes on Conceptualisms, 16. 
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 6
 The act of reframing then transforms the pre-text into the post-text. The features of 
allegory are significant here and illuminate the operations at work in the transfiguration of the 
text. For Fitterman and Place, in allegorical writing, ‘prosody shuttles between a micro 
attention to language and macro strategies of language i.e the use of source materials in 
reframing or mixing.’21 Macro strategies of language are found in Statement of Facts at the 
structural level of appropriation. The title Tragodía, playing on the Ancient Greek word for 
tragedy (tragōidia), invokes the work as a contemporary tragic drama. The thirty-three 
sections in the first volume, each titled ‘Statement of Facts’, are constituted by the legal 
documents lifted by Place and resituated onto the literary page. Each section is a collage, the 
heterogeneous nature of which is significant to the work’s allegorical structure. In contrast to 
traditional allegorical writing, Fitterman and Place assert, conceptual writing must have the 
capacity to embody ‘unintended pre- or post- textual associations.’ This manifestation 
‘abrogates allegory’s (false) simulation of mastery, while remaining faithful to allegory’s 
(profound) interruption of correspondences.’ ‘Allegory’, Fitterman and Place claim, ‘breaks 
mimesis via its constellatory features.’ 22  The large-scale conceptual apparatus of 
appropriation and collage in Tragodía annul the legal text’s claim to mastery and frame the 
smaller scale conceptual gestures that make language the most prominent feature of the 
writing. An instance of this occurs at the outset of each volume in the table of contents.  The 
lists of the thirty-three identical titles of the cases, ‘Statements of Facts’, ‘Statement of the 
Case’, and ‘Argument’, acquire a density in their repetition and indicate the constraint and 
indifference of the ideological discourse of the legal system. This oppression, conveyed in the 
reiteration of the functional titles, prefaces the eclipsing of the victims by the language of the 
law, a pervading aspect of the texts that becomes apparent through reframing.  A similar 
pattern occurs in the second volume, Statement of the Case, in the lists of the counts upon 
which the appellant in the case has been convicted. One extensive list details sixty-four 
counts upon which the appellant was found guilty as charged. Each count is detailed along 
with the details of the sentence: 
 
count 1 – one-third the midterm of four years, doubled as a second strike, run  
consecutively; 
count 2 – fifty years to life, pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (d)(4); 
count 3 – the upper term of 8 years, doubled as a second strike, run consecutively; 
count 4 – the upper term of 8 years, doubled as a second strike, run consecutively; 
                                                        
21
 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 21. 
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 7
count 5 – one-third the midterm of four years, doubled as a second strike, run 
consecutively;23 
 
The sentence preceding the list states that the appellant in this case was sentenced to 1,040 
years and an additional ten life times. In a literary context, the repetition of sentences (in both 
the legal and literary meanings of the word) has the effect of linguistic accumulation that 
reflects both the excessive violence of the crime and the illogicality of the sentence passed. 
The appellant will likely only ever be able to serve one eighth, at the very most, of the total 
number of years to which he has been sentenced. In a literary context then the numbers 
become ideogrammatic of the violence inflicted by the appellant, crimes documented in the 
previous volume, Statement of Facts. Elsewhere, Place has pointed to the difference between 
mimesis and metamorphosis with regards to conceptual writing.
24
 In this instance of 
contextual metamorphosis cited above, the transformation from the legal object to the figural 
object is evident. Parallel meanings characteristic of allegory abound (the inflected 
‘sentence’). Words lose their legal meanings, ‘count’ becomes an ironic imperative, and the 
final sentence: ‘This appeal from a final judgment of conviction is timely’
25
 acquires a 
sardonic tone.   
 Each section of the third volume, Argument, the most manifold part of Tragodía in 
terms of textual collage, opens with an indented statement in block capitals, set apart from the 






APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS ON THOSE COUNTS INVOLVING RIKKI E. MUST 
BE REVERSED AS THE WITNESS’S FACIAL COVERING  
DURING THE TRIAL VIOLATED APPELLANT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT  
TO CONFRONTATION AND TO A FAIR TRIAL 
 
 As noted, Rikki E. testified wearing large sunglasses and a headscarf. 
Defense counsel repeatedly objected to the disguise, noting that even after the scarf 
                                                        
23 Place, Tragodía 2: Statement of the Case (Los Angeles: Blanc Press, 2011), 44. 
24
 Place, ‘Afterword’ to I’ll Drown My Book, 445. 
25 Place, Tragodía 2: Statement of the Case, 47. 
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 8
was removed during testimony, Rikki’s eyes and the top portion of her face were not 
visible through the dark glasses. (RT 4:665, 4:768-770, 5:903-904, 7:115)26 
 
The block capitals draw attention to the law’s imperative that Rikki. E be exposed to her 
alleged attacker. Through the typographical design of the text, as with the ‘counts’ in 
Statement of the Case, the absurdity of the proposition is foregrounded, the appellant could be 
released from the charge of a violent sexual assault based on the victim’s wish not to be 
subjected to his gaze.  Such conceptual gestures function at once to devalue the texts as 
instruments of the law and to recast their features in light of the linguistic edifice of which 
they are a part. As a result of the work of the allegorist, ‘the work is invented via its 
adoption.’27 
 In terms of the contextual transformation from pre-text to post-text, Tragodía 
operates at both the macro and micro levels, at the macro level of the allegorical structure of 
the work, and Place’s conceptual act of reframing, to the micro level of drawing attention to 
the inflections and subversions generated by restaging language. Allegory renders the text in 
the manner that Fitterman and Place suggest: ‘Pure conceptualism negates the need for 
reading in the traditional textual sense – one does not need to “read” the work as much as 
think about the idea of the work.’
28
 The reinvention of the work is an example of that which 
Place and Fitterman understand to be ‘re-it ration’ or ‘re-cognition.’29 At the micro level of 
the language and the content of the narratives, the new literary context reveals the oppression 
of the victim’s speech acts, as well as the potential resistance of the conceptual text. The 
following textual analysis, that explores corollary issues of the question of hermeneutics and 
the performative use of indifference in Place’s conceptual writing, seeks to determine if 
agency and subjectivity can be found or felt in the discursive construction of Tragodía, or if 
the deformation of the victims speech acts by the law has erased these elements completely. 
 
The Question of Interpretation 
 
Reading Tragodía as a feminist act of reframing brings to light the nature of interpretation as 
it is found in Place’s conceptual text. In Tragodía, interpretation is the opposite of 
hermeneutics. The law’s nomothetic rendering of the victims’ discourse reifies, systematizes, 
and consequently deforms the narratives – it is this deformation that is the work of 
interpretation. By contrast, as Place remarks, the conceptual text is precisely ‘writing that 
                                                        
26 Place, Tragodía 3: Argument (Los Angeles: Blanc Press, 2011), 143. 
27 Fitterman and Place, Notes on Conceptualisms, 26. 
28
 Ibid., 25. 
29 Ibid.,  26. 
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 9
does not self-interpret, is not self-reflexive, at least not on the page.’30 Place’s contextual 
transference from the law to the literary brings legal discourse under linguistic scrutiny and 
exposes the violence of the interpretative logic at work in the legal text. Foregrounding 
linguistic structures, the post-text brings to light the discursive formations of the legal 
documents. In Statement of Facts, the victims in the rape cases are interpellated by their 
names and yet their voices and testimonies are eclipsed through the structures of narration. 
The accused remain anonymous, shielded as linguistic placeholders by ideological discourse, 
interpellated simply as ‘appellant’ or ‘suspect’. The following excerpt is just one example: 
 
 Appellant came to the bed and raped Arianna; either Suspect 1 or 4 was 
 standing by the bed. Miranda was screaming in the bathroom. Suspect 3, 
 standing by the wall, said Miranda had to shut up; appellant gave the gun to 
 Suspect 3, who pointed it at Miranda, who dropped to her knees, Suspect 3 
 put the gun to Miranda’s head and pulled the trigger. There was no shot, and 
 the men laughed and called Suspect 3 “Psycho.” Suspect 3 told Miranda that 
 it was her lucky day: there were two bullets in the gun. (RT 4:1835-1839, 
 4:2143-2145)31 
 
The coexistence of framing and telling throws the text into ambivalence. On the one hand, 
Arianna and Miranda are named, identified, and thus given a degree of subjectivity that the 
appellant and the suspects are not. Such interpellation is held in uneasy conflict with the 
reduction of their traumatic experience to a factual account, an act that linguistically shields 
the perpetrators through the omission of the victim’s subjective renditions of the events. 
Through reframing, Tragodía stages the narratives and, in doing so, embodies a dialectical 
tension between the victims’ narrativization of the traumatic experiences of rape, bodily 
harm, and sexual abuse and the dissemination of these narratives in the ideological discourse 
of the legal system. The following is an excerpt from a Prosecution Case that details the rape 
case of Tye, a girl who was ten years old at the time of the trial; the appellant is her great 
uncle: 
 
 Tye was crying during the assault examination. She told the attending deputy 
 that the day before she had been watching TV on the floor of Uncle Jackie’s 
 apartment when Uncle Jackie told his girlfriend Vondra to take a shower. 
 After Vondra left, he told Tye she could lie on the bed. He lay down next to 
                                                        
30 Place, ‘Afterword’ to I’ll Drown My Book, 446. 
31 Vanessa Place, Tragodía I: Statement of Facts (Los Angeles: Blanc Press, 2010), 203. 
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 her, pulled down his pants, and put his “pee-pee” in her mouth. He put his 
 hands over Tye’s mouth when she started to scream. After taking his penis 
 out of her mouth, appellant put two fingers in her “coo-coo,” then put his penis 
 in her vagina. Tye tried to push appellant away, kneed him in the groin and bit 
 his neck. Tye described appellant’s penis as getting bigger and described him 
 ejaculating. Appellant left the bed, and Tye called her mother. (RT 4: 1264-
 1270, 4:1294-1295)32 
 
The statements fuse the victim’s discourse with that of the law. Tye’s voice and distress are 
overruled by the objective narration that deforms Tye’s traumatic experience of sexual abuse. 
In the legal narration a third party narrates the sufferer’s testimony. The legal and medical 
terminology (the latter more pronounced at other points in Statement of Facts that document 
the medical reports of the victims’ injuries) lacks affect and inflicts violence; there are no 
modifiers for anatomical words such as ‘penis’, ‘ejaculating’ and ‘vagina’ in the legal 
account. By comparison, the child’s linguistic register that signals her prepubescence 
modifies the experience linguistically, she uses the euphemism “coo-coo” in place of vagina 
and “pee-pee” to substitute “penis”. The unmediated medical and legal language relating an 
instrumental understanding of the victim’s trauma conflicts with the language of the sufferer. 
The child’s unadulterated linguistic regist r is adulterated by the law through the act of 
interpretation. The abuse of Tye appears in this passage to be emphasized by the deformation 
of her language by the figures of the law. In short, the act of interpretation in Statement of 
Facts is an act of deformation of the subjects’ speech acts. 
 
The Violence of Indifference 
 
In Place’s work, the impersonal constructions of the victims’ narratives within legal discourse 
manifest a violence of indifference at the level of institutional language, this is apparent in the 
analysis of Tye’s narrative discussed above. The phenomenology of affect is essential to 
Tragodía. It could be assumed that the original statements related to the figures of the law 
embody affect. However, the textual deformation of the speech acts by the figures of the law 
to whom they are related precludes such an assumption, as the falsification of the narratives 
through institutional transmission into statements of facts renders any such assertion mere 
conjecture. In this way, the interpretation of the victim’s narratives by the law delegitimizes 
any attempt at a hermeneutical enquiry into the text. It is worth noting here that for scholars in 
the field of trauma studies, theirs is precisely a desire to study the effects of trauma, to 
                                                        
32 Place, Statement of Facts, 155. 
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understand, interpret, and redeem sense, precisely at the site where sense has been eradicated.  
In this way institutional oppression in Tragodía extends out from the text and it is the 
exposure of such oppression that forms part of the institutional critique in Place’s act of 
reframing. 
 Affect then has been disabled by the law. The legal discourse denies a relationship 
between affectivity and rationality in the narratives, offering only a site for the latter. 
Interestingly, there are references to the victims’ posttraumatic conditions in a number of the 
statements: 
 
 The nurse practitioner who examined Sara described her as placid and 
 cooperative.  The woods lamp scan was negative for bodily fluids; the nurse 
 collected vaginal, cervical, anal, external genital, and breast swabs. Sara 
 described the assault and her assailant, and said she was numb. There were 
 ligature marks on Sara’s wrists, and an abrasion on her knee; her hymen and 
 vagina were bruised, consistent with blunt force pressure. There were fresh 
 abrasions on her anal area, consistent with friction. These injuries were not 
 consistent with consensual sex. There was no injury to the scalp, though this 
 is not inconsistent with having one’s hair pulled. (RT 3:1828-1851, 3:1855, 
 3:1874-1882, 3:1885-1896) Sara’s demeanour was consistent with post-
 traumatic stress disorder. (RT 3:1910, 3:1917-1918)33 
 
Told in the third person, Sara’s narrative is obscured by the legal and medical reports of her 
trauma. The reference to post-traumatic stress disorder and Sara’s ‘demeanor’ are slight in 
comparison to the lengthy, detailed, and explicit objective narrative of the physical trauma 
she has experienced, as forensic evidence in legal discourse is privileged over the narrative of 
the victims. It is the perception of the nurse who is given authority to assess Sara that takes 
precedence, and it is the nurse who states that Sara’s exterior behavior was ‘placid’ and 
‘cooperative’. The nurse practitioner is given agency over the victim. Sara’s own narrative is 
adumbrated into the fact of recollection: ‘Sara described the assault and her assailant, and said 
that she was numb.’ Whilst Sara’s desensitized condition is reported, this condition of 
numbness is not expressed. Such objective renderings of Sara’s own testimony repudiate 
affect, either in its presence or absence.  Indeed such instances of linguistic obfuscation 
highlight the importance of the role of language, diction, and syntax in representing affect, 
when affect is, in Denise Riley’s terms, attached to ‘the expressive intentions of an individual 
                                                        
33 Place, Statement of Facts, 123.  
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speaker.’34 There is, as Riley formulates in her recent body of work, another form of affect, 
‘the animated word’s power’
35
 that is, to a certain extent, independent of an individual 
speaker. In this sense, a negative affect of indifference is at work in Place’s practice. At times 
Sara is detached from her own body by the legal discourse, dispossessed by the lack of a 
possessive pronoun: ‘the nurse collected vaginal, cervical, anal, external genital, and breast 
swabs’. Her body is objectified, mutilated through medical description, and Sara, divested of 
personhood, becomes a universal placeholder: ‘There was no injury to the scalp, though this 
is not inconsistent with having one’s hair pulled’ (my italics). Within such a legal framing 
affectivity has been erased. 
 At other times, references to the victim’s condition appear in footnotes. In the case 
that relates the gang rape of two women, Arianna and Miranda, the footnotes reveal that 
Arianna’s narrative is almost entirely absent from the statement. As a gloss to a particularly 
traumatic part of the statement that tells of multiple sexual assaults on Arianna, a footnote 
reads: ‘Arianna could not relate a specific sequence of events after this: she could not say 
what happened or how many times. (RT 4:1834, 4:1841, 4:2126, 4:2126-2127)’36 . Here 
Place’s pure appropriation, which leaves the clerk’s notes and footnotes in the post-text, 
reveals the way in which Arianna is subordinated structurally within the institutional narrative 
and by the legal paratextual elements. 
37
 In the annotation Arianna has linguistic agency, yet 
she remains narrated by the law, the auxiliary statement that concerns her is outside of the 
main text and enclosed by the numbered footnote and the clerk’s notes in parentheses. In the 
linguistic constructions of the section of the text to which the note refers, apart from one 
statement where she has dual agency with Miranda (‘Miranda and Arianna asked not to let 
them in’), Arianna is passive, relegated to an ancillary position within the statements in which 
the appellant or the suspects are active: ‘Appellant withdrew from Arianna’; ‘Suspect 1 got on 
to the bed with Arianna, had her masturbate him’; ‘Suspect 3 and 4 went to the bed and 
fondled Arianna’; ‘Suspect 1 returned to Arianna’s bed’; ‘Suspect 4 fondled Arianna for a 
moment […] had Arianna orally copulate him’; ‘Arianna was always being orally penetrated 
by one while the other was vaginally penetrating her’; ‘Appellant came to the bed and raped 
Arianna.’ Arianna’s posttraumatic state is referred to within the text: 
 
Miranda did most of the talking to the police because Arianna was “in a really 
bad place” at the time. They walked back to the building, because the officers 
needed the women to go into the apartment. Arianna couldn’t at first, so 
                                                        
34
 Denise Riley, Impersonal Passion: Language as Affect (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2005), 5. 
35 Place, Statement of Facts, 123. 
36
 Ibid., 203. 
37 Ibid. 
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Miranda did. After being reassured of her safety, Arianna also went upstairs 
and showed the officers where the attack took place. None of the  suspects 
were present, but Arianna saw appellant’s picture on a dining table. Arianna 
was confused, and vomited. They were transported to the  hospital and 
interviewed and examined. Arianna was not very cooperative at the hospital 
because she just wanted to go home. (RT 4:1882, 4:1891,  4:2103-2105, 
4:2161-2165)38 
 
It is not entirely clear if the citation from the original statement that appears in the first 
sentence (“in a really bad place”) is spoken by Miranda or Arianna. Either way, the idiomatic 
quotation here highlights the tension between framing and telling. It is not unreasonable to 
speculate that the language of Arianna’s original testimony would have embodied affect, as 
the legal statement here refers to her confusion and her state of shock. The final sentence of 
the extract: ‘Arianna was not very cooperative at the hospital because she just wanted to go 
home’ is an instance of a certain linguistic traction found in many of the statements. In this 
statement the language of the law strains to contain the victim’s narrative. The first clause 
‘Arianna was not very cooperative’ subsumes Arianna into the statement of the figure of the 
law telling the facts. The second clause however struggles to contain Arianna’s verbal 
testimony within Standard English. As an example of many instances of free indirect 
discourse in the statements, Arianna’s voice breaks through in the word ‘just’. It registers 
Arianna’s anxiety and points to the absent affective speech acts that have been deformed and 
linguistically standardized.  This moment of slippage can also be read as a poetic act. Place 
has not altered the legal statement, but as Moschovakis observes: ‘Statement of Facts is not 
only conceptual poetry written by a writer-slash-appellate attorney. These are appellate briefs 
written – the old fashioned way – by a poet.’39 Moschovakis’s remark calls into question the 
origin of Place’s poetic practice. Place’s conceptual writing occurs in the act of appropriation 
yet her poetic practice may have indeed begun when she wrote the briefs.40 
 The effect of the investigation on Arianna also suggests a form of violence inflicted 
on the victim by the systematic examination imposed in criminal law. Leone Sandra Hankey, 
a feminist scholar and a member of the California bar, states that ‘[f]eminist legal scholars 
and criminologists document and analyze the phenomenon that raped women who report the 
crime often experience a “second assault” from the legal system that has supposedly been 
                                                        
38 Place, Statement of Facts, 206. 
39
 Moschovakis, ‘Poetics of Guilt’, 10.  
40
 The documentation of Tye’s juvenile language would be another instance of this practice.  
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designed to help them.’41 The note to the section cited above points to Arianna’s memory 
loss, possibly due to trauma: ‘Arianna testified that she did not recall exactly what she told 
police or hospital staff in terms of who did what to her how often.’42 A later note reads: 
‘According to Wall, Arianna was extremely distraught and difficult to talk to; Miranda 
provided all the information about the assault.’43 Richard Wall, the watch field supervisor 
narrates Arianna’s condition; again her distress is relegated to the footnotes.  Significantly, 
the statement also points to Arianna’s transformation after the assault: ‘Arianna “became a 
different person” after the attack. She went to counseling, sought medical treatment, and 
became isolated from friends and family. She could not be alone, but the only person she 
could be with was Miranda. She hated “her own people” and could not be around people 
speaking Spanish. (RT 4:1891-1894, 4:2161)’44 . The legal accounts cite the parts of the 
victims’ narratives that do not contain affect. Affect would be present if the parts of Arianna’s 
verbal statement that expressed anxiety were cited. Instead, the legal interpretation of her 
speech act omits affective words. As a consequence, the reader of the text is left only with 
supposition with regards to Arianna’s affective discourse. 
 Through reframing, Place’s allegorical work draws attention to the distortion of the 
victims’ speech acts by the figures of the law who interpret those narratives. New narratives 
are created through interpretation in which the victims are reified into the objective language 
of the law. The result is that within Statement of Facts, the victims are unable to constitute 
themselves through their speech acts. Immobilized within the rigid constructions of Standard 
English, any affect apparent in the original narratives has been erased and thus subjectivity 
has been occluded. As such, in the literary document as a read narrative, the agency intrinsic 
to personhood is not possible because the subjects’ speech acts have been deformed.   
   
Performing Indifference 
 
Performance is a major extra-textual feature of Place’s allegorical work. In her seminal work, 
The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage (1999), Perloff posits the Aristotelian 
constituent part of tragedy, opsis, or spectacle, to be a significant element of performance, in 
                                                        
41 Leone Sandra Hankey, ‘Women Write Patriarchal Wrongs: Narrative Resistance to Rape 
Culture’ in Beyond Portia: Women, Law, and Literature in the United States, edited by 
Jacqueline St. Joan and Annette Benington McElhiney (Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 1997), 204. 
42 Place, Statement of Facts, 206. 
43 Ibid., 207. 
44 Ibid., 206-7. 
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that ‘it establishes a unique relationship between artist and audience.’45 The performative use 
of indifference is a critical component of Place’s conceptual practice. Place stages apathy in 
her performances of Tragodía 1: Statement of Facts. Kenneth Goldsmith has remarked on the 
importance of the performative dimension of Place’s work. ‘When you hear Place read these 
words,’ he states, ‘you realize that the vile content of the work is just the tip of the iceberg. 
What happens to you, the listener, during the reading is what makes what she’s doing so 
important.’46 Her voice, soft, monotone, detached, unaffected by the violence of the content 
of the narratives, reifies the narratives of the victims theatrically in a manner that mirrors the 
codification of the victim’s narratives within legal discourse. Within the discursive 
construction of the text, facts oppress the subjects being narrated, objectivity replaces 
subjectivity. Place does not alleviate this violence in her performances, she makes no attempt 
to reinstate the personhood of the narratives that has been erased in the institutional 
transmission from the victim’s statement to legal statement. Her voice operates to 
homogenize both the victims’ and appellants’ testimonies. Bringing their narratives into the 
same voice illuminates the enforced imbrication of individual narrative with legal discourse 
and the consequent obscuring of personhood in legal discourse.  
 Through Place’s lack of mediation between text and audience, the performance of 
Statement of Facts opens up a space of participation.
47
  Fitterman and Place suggest that 
conceptual writing ‘might be best defined not by the strategies used but by the expectations of 
the readership or thinkership.’
48
 The traumatic impact of the performance of the text on the 
audience resides in the lack of mediation and precipitates a question of ethics. ‘If there is an 
ethics specific to appropriation’, Fitterman and Place contend, ‘it is enacted in the question of 
editing. Does the writer edit, for example, online language because it is offensive? Does the 
act of editing becomes another ethical problem?’ Crucially, the writers ask, ‘Does the failure 
to edit become collusion?’ 49  This is a central issue that arises when Place’s work is 
understood as cultural critique. For if the act of reframing does not provide a structure 
through which elements of personhood can be known, then the conceptual text is partly 
complicit in the erasure of personhood inflicted by legal discourse. 
 At the level of performance, Place’s poetic practice creates a field of relations that 
intentionally generates trauma. Goldsmith remarks on his experience of listening to Place 
                                                        
45 Marjorie Perloff, The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage (Northwestern 
University Press, 1999), 289. 
46 Kenneth Goldsmith, Uncreative Writing: Managing Language in the Digital Age (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 104. 
47 A number of Place’s readings are available on the web, for instance the reading at Point 
Ephémère, Paris, 30.9.11. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5V7gk8Totk 
48
 Fitterman and Place, Notes on Conceptualisms, 10. 
49 Ibid., 41. 
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read: ‘Hers is a poetics of realism: one so real that it’s almost too much to bear.’50 The 
unendurable element of Place’s performance experienced by Goldsmith is brought about by 
pure appropriation. Goldsmith remarks that Place’s lengthy readings, forty-five minutes or 
more, begin after a while ‘to feel like a Hollywood movie, replete with tragedy and 
redemption.’51  Goldsmith’s reading here is problematic, as his rendering of the action of the 
narratives as redemptive in the Hollywood sense implies catharsis. In the text and in Place’s 
readings there is no remedial interpretation of the text by the poet. As such there is no 
catharsis, as the interpretative logic of the law has disabled affect. Rather, the members of the 
audience, in listening to the statements, experience trauma, as a result of their exposure to the 
unmediated material. Place’s performance foils the theatrical parts of Tragodía in her refusal 
to interpret and mediate. This element of Place’s conceptual practice embodies an ethics of 
appropriation that can be positioned as a recalcitrant gesture against the violence of 
interpretation imposed by the law.  
 Place’s performance in this vein can be understood as a strategy of failure. Paralleling 
her failure to edit the material in the conceptual act of reframing, the theatrical dimension of 
Place’s work is ‘an assassination of mastery’, a rejection of the figure of the poet as mediator.  
Place’s performance accords to the text’s status as a transcript (and the subject’s status as 
transcribed):  
 
 12a. transcript is a work of failure: the prosody used refers to a failed system 
 (politics) of a failed humanity. A failure on all fronts; one that cannot exist save in its 
 constant manifestation of a constant absence – the citation without content, with 
 partial content, with mutilated content.52 
  
Statement of Facts can be thought of as the last of these manifestations, whereby the 
mutilation occurs in the pre-text. Within the space of the mutilated texts there is the constant 
manifestation of the absence of affect. For Fitterman and Place, the text’s status as a transcript 
relates directly to ‘the word as wound […] (the site of failure).’
53
 Fitterman and Place argue 
that in contemporary allegorical writing, failure has the capacity to ‘irrupt the work, violating 
it from within.’
54
 Furthermore, they propose that ‘this invites the reader to redress failure, 
hallucinate repair.’ 55  Read within the context of these notes, it becomes apparent that 
Statement of Facts invites such a response but it is precisely the impossibility of the 
                                                        
50 Goldsmith, Uncreative Writing, 107. 
51
 Ibid., 105. 
52 Fitterman and Place, Notes on Conceptualisms, 54. 
53 Ibid., 55. 
54
 Ibid., 25. 
55 Ibid., 25. 
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hallucination of repair that situates the audience within the experience of the posttraumatic 
subject, an experience generated by the text yet, paradoxically, absent in the redacted 
narratives of the law. Place’s strategy of pure appropriation runs counter to the redaction 
inherent to narratives that she appropriates. The intentional generation of trauma in the 
performance of Tragodía 1: Statement of Facts functions to recover the affect overwritten in 
the narratives by legal discourse. As a consequence, two modes of performativity emerge in 
Place’s work. At the level of the legal text, performativity occurs, to use Judith Butler’s 
formulation, ‘as that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates 
and constrains.’56 In their notes, Fitterman and Place cite Wystan Curnow: ‘Curnow notes that 
conceptual writing invites its own performativity, a performativity that … is an attempt to 
disembed the meaning “in the contingent and the contextual.”’57 This form of performativity 
occurs in the act of reframing and, concomitantly, in Place’s performance. Arguably, by 
recontextualising the work from the courtroom to the public reading venue, the performative 
act of reframing parallels the allegorical structure of the conceptual text. 
Performance creates a site of resistance within Place’s conceptual writing. In the text 
of Statement of Facts, identity has been erased by the deformation of the victims’ speech acts. 
Transformation for the narrated subjects is impossible, as the victims’ personhood has been 
eclipsed and as a result, within the oppressive discursive construction, there is no site for the 
self, and, therefore no site for the becoming other of the self. In Tragodía contextual 
deformation has erased subjectivity in the victims’ narratives. Place’s conceptual writing can 
be understood as resistance at the level of performance, and at the level of the conceptual act 
of reframing. Place’s performance creates a site of reception between text and audience that is 
also space of trauma. The members of the audience, as constituted subjects, are liable to 
deconstitution through trauma and the involuntary generation of affect procured by 
witnessing trauma. Thus through performance, Place’s conceptual practice opens up a site of 
affectual resistance, denied to the victims of sexual assault within the original legal 
documents. The allegorical structure, the movement from pre-text to post-text, reframes the 
legal text in such a way that it enables the formation of alterity, it becomes something other as 
a work of literature yet the post-text remains identical to the pre-text in content. In this vein, 
Place’s Tragodía brings to light a bipartite field of the resistance of the conceptual text. 
Performance opens up a site of resistance impossible within the text, and, in revealing this 
impossibility Place’s practice critiques the oppression of the victim’s discourse and the 
reification of the subject within the ideological language of the law. The victims’ narratives 
                                                        
56 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (London: Routledge, 
2011), xii. 
57 Fitterman and Place, Notes on Conceptualisms, 21. Curnow’s paper was presented at the 
Conceptual Writing Conference held at the University of Arizona Poetry Centre in 2008. 
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have been decontextualized and deformed. The act of pure appropriation can be understood as 
an act of decontextualisation but one through which the narratives remain intact. Reframing 
becomes an ethical gesture, a paratextual pathway to metamorphosis, positioned against the 
linguistic deformation that takes place in the legal narratives. The move from the cultural 
conditions in the pre-text to new narrative conditions in the post-text is a repositioning that, in 
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